The Political Parties and NGO’s of Belarus and Election Campaigns

Political parties are known to classically play the decisive role within the course of the election campaigns. Gaining power serves as their major goal. Election results clearly evaluate the influence rate of this or that political elite as well as their structures upon the voters. NGOs, as a rule, are in charge of organization of mobilization of the population and involvement of the latter in the process of formation of representative power. 

This is recognized to be a routine strategy.

However, Belarusian politics and public life are known to have been deformed very much. On the one hand, party organizations (especially on the regional level) have actually become the integral part of the third sector. Usually, they are the NGOs which proclaim their political aims and they are not represented within the frame of the governmental bodies. On the other hand, most of the NGOs get politicized as even protection of human rights or publication of a bulletin or a local newspaper as well as activities dealing with the issues of regional geography and revival of the native language are considered to be the "politics". 

Our current experience speaks in favor of the fact that Belarusian democratic opposition can potentially win only in case it consolidates its forces.

This is the rule as Belarus fails to currently possess any all-sufficient political force. Only active work within the coalition forces can lead us to victory and success.

What is the structural pattern of the opposition that is facing the election campaigns of 2004 and 2006. It comprises political parties, NGOs, independent labor unions and mass media. United Civil Party (AHP), BNF (Belarusian People's Front) as well as BSDH (Belarusian Social and Democratic Hramada) which is to unite with social democrats lead by Karol and Paliavikava. Under definite conditions they can be joined by the Party of Communists of Belarus (PKB; headed by Kaliakin). It is quite obvious that the BSDP (HG) headed by Statkevich and the LDPB (headed by Gaidukevich) will traditionally play their own games.

It should be taken into account that oppositional parties in this country are few in number and do not have a branched structure. This is their real problem and not guilt. Boycott of the previous election campaigns by the democratic organizations made very negative contribution, i.e. to the significant degree the parties lost their contacts with the population and forgot how to "be together with the regular men in the street". Their representatives have not been elected as the members of Parliament and Soviets for years, nobody has ever seen them on TV and heard on the radio. As these parties fail fulfill their major function, i.e. lobbying interests of various layers of the society, they are known to suffer from constant lack of financial resources. 

Party organizations in the outskirts of the regions have marginalized and often resemble the closed clubs of political associates. Their edge-cutting problem today deals with the chronic absence of any real activities conducted by them. Therefore, they are to face a painful process of leaving their reservations as well as hard work of party construction.

The Third Sector, in spite of adverse conditions, has been steadily developing within the recent decade, in general, and especially intensive prior to 2001, in particular. Currently 97 of 117 districts in this country are known to have structures of the civic community. There are more than 2800 registered NGOs in Belarus and approximately similar number of the unregistered public initiatives. Spectrum of their activities is much broader as compared to the similar one in the former post-soviet countries. The Third Sector has a well developed infrastructure, i.e. the network of resource centers in 61 towns and cities as well as the umbrella structures (I.e. the largest Assembly of democratic NGOS) and significant experience of working within the frame of coalitions. NGOs are known to comprise most of the new democratic elite. Also, last but not least, the public sector tends to have reasonably stable financial sources. Active people can realize their ambitions mainly working within the structures of the Third Sector. Very narrow social basis as well as their insignificant influence upon the broad masses of the population in this country remain to be the most burning issue of the non-governmental organizations. They are caused by severe counteraction of the authorities against spread of influence of the Third Sector as well as lack of understanding of the necessity to get out of the democratic ghetto on the part of numerous NGOS.

Two-third of total number of mass-media in Belarus is known to comprise the non-governmental ones. However, we witness predomination of the government-controlled press due to significantly larger circulation of their newspapers. Although we need to emphasize that the said circulations tend to also reduce with every coming year, i.e. recently they have dropped down by 9 per cent. The regime is making enormous efforts to intensively develop TV system in this country. They are in the process of creation of the second all-national TV channel while the regional TV centers tend to broadcast more and more Russian TV channels.

As for the all-national popularity rate of the government-controlled newspapers it looks as follows: the "Sovetskaya Belorussiya (Soviet Byelorussia) is read by 38.4 per cent of the population; the "Respublika" (Republic) – by 19.2 per cent of readers, the "7 Dnei" (Seven Days) – by 12.3 of the subscribers. The population rate of the most frequently read non-governmental newspapers, i.e. the "Narodnaya Volia" (People's Will) and the "Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta" (Belarusian Business Newspaper) is much lower and comprises 8.9 and 7.9 per cent, correspondingly. 

In the regions there is a certain number of towns and cities (i.e. Brest, Hrodna, Baranavichy, Slonim, Babruisk, Smarhon, Barysau, Maladechna etc.) in which the independent newspapers enjoy similar influence upon the population as compared to the government-controlled ones; sometimes their population rate is even stronger. This status quo causes nervousness and aggressive reaction on the part of the authorities. (At one of the recent seminars on current ideological matters A. Lukashenka sharply criticized such a situation and demanded as follows: "It is high time for the Ministry of Information to join efforts with the Vertikal to get the situation under control").

The local authorities in all the districts tend to ban creation of new newspapers and close down the existing ones (they have already closed down more than 20 of them). We can easily predict that the pressure upon the non-governmental publications will be getting stronger and stronger of the eve of the referendum and election campaigns, the number of such newspapers will significantly reduce and censorship of the existing ones will become even more severe.

For similar reasons, the non-governmental radio FM-channels and cable TV can hardly be treated as serious factors that could influence upon the political and social life in this country. Internet seems to be a more effective means of communication, but only about 2 per cent of the population have an access to the Internet sources in Belarus. However, these two percent of the population comprise presumably young people (students) and their number is increasing with every coming day. 

On the local level we have about 300 local small newspapers and NGOs bulletins that are distributed free of charge and are published under the guidance and support of the BARC in 10 towns of all the regional centers of Belarus. This very network tends to have a huge potential for their future activities within the course of the election campaign thanks to their positive experience gained during the election campaign of 2001 and the sufficient number of specialists; also, they have a reliable and permanent access to Internet sources of NGOs of largest cities of the country (UNDP/OSI).

Non-governmental Labor Unions have been united by the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Labor Unions, the latter comprising the Free Belarusian Labor Union (FBLU) and the Belarusian Independent Labor Union (BILU). The FBLU unites about 6 000 members, although in 1995 it comprised more than 10 000 active members. This organization has a large number of smaller affiliates scattered all over the country. The BILU comprises about 10 000 members and its largest branches are located at the enterprises of chemical and mining industry, i.e. in Salihorsk (2 5000 members), Navapolatsk (1 500), Hrodna (1 000) AND Mazyr ( 1 000). 

What sort of experience did the democratic opposition gain within the course of the previous election campaigns? The major deal of experience was gained during the presidential election campaign of 2001. Prior to the said elections, they have set up the two consolidation centers that were operating based on the vertical and horizontal principles of their activities. The Coordination Council of Democratic Forces (CCDF) has been founded at the Congress of Democratic Forces in 2000 which aimed primarily at selection of a universal candidate who would represent oppositional forces. The Council comprised most of the democratic parties, independent and free labor unions, the “Hartiya-97”, Assembly of Democratic NGOs and representatives of all the regions of Belarus. Total its membership comprised 15 activists. The “Rehiyanalnaya Belarus” (Regional Belarus) turned out to be the second center of the amalgamation which was, in fact, the coalition of regional democratic coalitions of parties and public organizations. The “Rehiyanalnaya Belarus” had more than one third of total number of votes within the CCDF; it was thank to the presence of the representatives from the regions and Mr. Siamion DOMASH, their significant leader-candidate, the former governor of the Hrodna region.

Besides Mr. Domash, the CCDF had nominated two more candidates, i.e. Mr. Hancharyk, the leader of official Labor Unions and Mr. Chyhir, the former Prime-Minister of Belarus. The rating vote demonstrated the predominant advantage of Mr. Domash and its ratio comprised 12,5; 2.0 and 0.5, correspondingly.

However, “in an attempt to reach absolute unity and consensus”, the CCDF turned out to be indecisive enough, kept conducting the endless meetings and, therefore, lost its authority and initiative. The five potential candidates (Mr. Domash, Mr. Hancharyk, Mr. Chyhir, Mr. Kazluski and Mr, Kaliakin) took the initiative and they had to decide on who would be their “single” candidate and would meet all of their five commonly worked out and coordinated criteria.

All the five candidates started collecting signatures of voters and having finalized this stage, they have violated the previous agreement upon observation of the criteria and selected their single candidate, i.e. Mr. Hancharyk. Mr. Domash announced in his TV interview that he decided to cancel his candidacy and urged his supporters to vote for Mr. Hancharyk.

The campaign was a failure. It turned out to be withered and expressionless. There was even no sign of any serious competition.
What are the lessons that we should evoke from the election campaign of 2001?

- High protest spirits of about 70 per cent of voters had not been used advantage of; the “single” candidate, being a “pensioner”, a “labor union activist” (because “labor unions had not given anything to us), could hardly represent their interests at all;
- Intellectual level of the voters had been definitely underestimated while the voters were striving to realize WHY was the “single” candidate better as compared to the current president;
- The “single” candidate had been selected too late, i.e. under the conditions of information blockade it had to have been done at least half a year before the elections;
- questionable Gallup polls should not have influenced to a greater extent as compared to the prognoses of thousands of local public activists who experienced state of public opinion much better.
What were the positive outcomes of the election campaign of 2001?
- Broad unity of major democratic forces located in 97 towns and cities of this country where affiliates of Mr. Domash’s Election Headquarters were scattered;
- Realization of the fact that the under the absence of vast access to electronic mass media serious results within the course of the propaganda campaign can be achieved only with involvement of local leaders, public activists, and not the volunteers (even the best ones) who worked for money;
- Realization of the idea that one can hardly “copy” the election campaign technologies that have designed for different social conditions; in Belarus success can be achieved only in case of close cooperation among the parties, NGOs, labor unions and mass-media.

Unfortunately, the above conclusions were not used by the democratic forces as a guidance within the course of the previous campaign.

It goes without saying that the authorities created super extreme conditions aimed to control the election campaign process as well as to continuously and in a pointed manner to exterminate the independent candidates. The election campaign was neither free and fair nor transparent and equal for all the candidates. 

However, the main goal of the election campaign should deal not with acquiring of deputy mandates but with the influence upon minds and consciousness of the voters, mastering the lection campaign technologies which would work down the road within the course of future parliamentary and presidential elections and, last but not least, to create positive images for their organizations.

Total, all the parties proposed 1033 potential candidates for 24 128 mandates of the regional, town, district and rural Soviets. And even if all the candidates had won the elections, they would have comprised only 4 per cent (!) of the total number of seats in the local Soviets of Belarus. Out of 1 033 potential candidates 693 (67%) have been registered as the legal candidates of the election campaign. Losses of the parties comprised as follows: the LDPB – 44%, the SDP – 52%, the AHP – 58%, the BNF – 21%, the BSDP NH – 33%, the KPB – 19% and the PKB – 17%. 

Unwillingness of the parties and public organizations to participate in the local elections speaks in favor of their fewness and being not ready for the political competition. Also, the majority of members of the parties did not believe in their success; their realized that the local Soviets did not have any actual rights; they haven’t also been ready for meeting with the voters: they were simply afraid of visiting residential places of the latter. The youth movement of the republic turned out to be the most active and successful one. It is no wonder that they have achieved the best results. Political future definitely belongs to them. It also adds a bit of optimism to our common future.

How successfully will the democratic opposition participate in the parliamentary elections of 2004? How does the actual alignment of forces look like? What are its chances to win?

Let us review the current situation in the regions and electoral districts.

(Description of the Map)

The two main tendencies can be clearly seen that are present within the course of the current preparations for the election campaign. One of them deals with the separative slogan stating that “Each party participates in the election campaign on an independent basis and covers all the constituencies. We are fed up of assisting the non-party candidates who eventually happen to come to power down the road”. Another tendency, a coalition-based one, states that “There is no all-sufficient political or public force which compete the authorities during the non-democratic election campaign. We need to unite to a maximal extent”.

Evaluation of these two approaches to the election campaign strategy primarily depends upon what our ultimate goal for the coming three years is.

In case the goal of the coming 2004-campaign deals with consolidation of the party structures, promoting their own programs, expansion of their influence upon the voters, the first approach (tendency) can be applied.

In our case we do consider the coming parliamentary election campaign to be the next stage in our preparation for the presidential election campaign of 2006. The 2004-campaign should be used to get closer to the regular population of the country, to influence upon their mass consciousness, to unleash vast propaganda campaign, to work out propaganda technologies that would suit the Belarusian realities. All these aims can be successfully achieved only in case all the parties join their common efforts with the NGOs, labor unions, mass media as well as independent activists.

The experience gained speaks in favor of the fact that this union can acquire any form. The local coalitions in the majority of Belarusian towns and cities have already gained rich experience in this field, too; therefore, they need to have more freedom in coordination of their own activities. Desire to work together tends to grow gradually, step by step, especially it can be easily observed along the following chain of command: the capital ®regional centers®district towns. This strategy is quite natural and speak in favor of realistic impression of the majority of representatives of the democratic opposition. It is true that in Minsk the political parties can really conduct their activities on an independent scale; in the regional centers some fifty percent of their supports are comprised of non-party activists, and in the districts this ratio equals 2:3.

The below are strong points that speak in favor of joined activities within the frame of coalitions:
- Potential of NGOs and public initiatives will be used to the maximal extent;
- Information-and-propaganda oriented activities will be both of the all-national and local nature and won’t represent narrow interests of this or that party;
- Unity of the democratic opposition will be destroying the overall atmosphere of nihilism and passive attitude of the voters as well as will be giving more confidence to the part of the nomenclature;
- They will reduce the potential chances to fake up the final results of the votes;
- Such united activities and common goals will attract the new political “volunteers” who are ready to work for the victory and not for the leaders and their structures;
- They will create positive image of the opposition both in this country and abroad.

What kind of strategy should we apply within the course of the coming parliamentary elections campaign?
1. We need to work hard in each constituency as we will have to definitely do it within the course of the presidential election campaign;
2. We have to specify the constituencies in which we have the real chance to win the elections (we estimate them to comprise 50 per cent of the total number) and to concentrate our major manpower, organizational and financial resources in them;
3. The rest of the constituencies should be involved in our vast information-and-propaganda campaign to be conducted among all the voters;
4. We need to choose the strategy of selecting a single candidate but not work within the regions separately;
5. While choosing the single candidacy and working out tactics and strategy of the campaign, we need to direct our attention to the collective thoughts of the local coalitions.

What kind of activities could be conducted by the BARC?

The BARC network has been functioning since 1998. It comprises 61 organization representing 61 town of Belarus, i.e. 7 of them from the Minskaya province, 8 – from the Brestskaya province, 10 – from the Gomelskaya, 10 – from the Vitebskaya and 13 centers from the Mogilevskaya province. Resources are known to comprise information, education, legal protection, technical services, consulting services, fundraising, search for potential partners, NGOs data base, analytical studies. The aim of the activities of the network underwent definite changes, i.e. at the initial stage it served primarily as an incubator for the public initiatives; the second stage aimed at establishment of close cooperation between the NGOs + the Third Sector with the political parties, labor unions and mass media. Currently the key goal of the BARC network comprises creation of the local elites and establishment of cooperation among the three sectors. The BARC is known to have a well developed system of information exchange (the "BARCnews"), its own printing facilities, partnership-based relations with hundreds of regional and local NGOs; the center provides independent mass media as well as public initiatives from more than 50 towns of Belarus with a free of charge access to Internet.

Within the course of preparation for the parliamentary elections the BARC will conduct the scope of activities as follows:
- it will verify all the mobilization and political electoral potential in all the districts of Belarus;
- it will study and evaluate positive experience of its participation in the election campaign of 2003;
- it will make NGOs participation in the election campaign more active;
- it will prepare and process the materials for the candidates, i.e. the passports of the constituencies;
- it will carry out Gallup polls in order to evaluate potential problems in the regions;
- it will favor creation of local coalitions and develop criteria for selection of a single candidate;
- it will line up and train the observers;
- it will propose its members to be included into the local election committees;
- it will issue information materials for:
· the voters;
· the deputies;
· members of the election committees;
· the observers.
- it will prepare the press-releases fro the mass media;
- it will organize round-table discussions and press-conferences;
- it will distribute digests summing up the materials borrowed from the national and regional newspapers;
- it will develop special WEB-sites in Internet;
- it will provide the teams of the democratic leaders with the pertinent technical assistance i.e. a PC, a printer, a scanner, a Xerox-machine, a fax-machine, access to Internet and an office space.