Jacek Cichocki
Marek A. Cichocki
Paweł Kowal

Poland and the EU’s “Eastern Dimension” [1]

Introduction

The EU’s “Eastern Dimension” has not come into effect so far and one cannot definitively say if it ever comes to be. And even if it does, then to what extent will it respond to our expectations? The question is all the more valid as the exact design and implementation of the “eastern dimension” depend on a number of factors in international politics that today are hardly predictable. So why is it worth at all to deal with this problem? First of all, because the pursuit of a consistent policy towards the East will be, after the EU's forthcoming enlargement, one of the obvious determinants of the common national interests of Poland and of the EU as a community of European nations. The debate about the EU's “eastern dimension” is also prompted by the experiences of the EU's northern dimension. However, it should be admitted that, given the obvious differences between the present northern dimension and the potential “eastern dimension”, the latter would be much more than the former a factor of the EU's common foreign policy.

Discussion about the “eastern dimension”

First, it is worth defining some general assumptions that should delineate the EU’s “eastern dimension” at least to the extent that would make a discussion on its shape subject to certain rigours and discipline, so that it does not snowball into a general debate about the situation in the east of Europe, or becomes a simple summary of Poland’s eastern policy over the recent decade. The criteria that we propose are as follows:

a) restriction of the territorial and problem area of this concept for the benefit of its specificity, so that it is not merely an understated idea, but a concrete action programme,
b) giving up the aspiration to accommodate within this concept the entire shape of the EU's relations with the neighbour states in the east after the enlargement. Instead, the focus should be on cooperation and coordination of actions by those of EU member states that have an interest in the “eastern dimension”.
c) Allowing for the interests and possibilities of both individual states and regional structures, as well as other members of the enlarged EU (Visehrad Group, Baltic States' Group).

A proposed discussion about the principles of the EU's common foreign policy in the east of Europe in the post-enlargement future should not leave aside the Polish experience of the recent decade. After 1989, Poland was pursuing on the CEE scale an active policy towards its neighbours in the east. The new elites that came to power in Poland were under a big influence of our traditional thinking about Poland's eastern neighbours and their independence as the guarantee of our international security. A number of arguments ranging from sentimental to cultural to pragmatic were advanced in favour of an active eastern policy. They all centred on the will to ensure an enduring international security or potential economic benefits to Poland by strengthening its ties with the East. The political programme of the Paris-based “Kultura”, which was most often quoted to justify Poland's eastern policy, clearly stated that a policy in support of the sovereignty, independence and national rebirth of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus and a policy of building good relations with Russia should in the future constitute one of the pillars of Poland's foreign policy.

It thus happened that the eastern policy, next to the postulate of Poland's accession to NATO and the EU, has been an immutable feature of the policies pursued by successive Polish government descended from various political parties. There is no room here to draw up a balance-sheet of the to-date Polish eastern policy, all the less so as, in contrast to the accession to NATO and the EU, it would be hard to refer in this case to any specific verifiable evidence of a failure or a success. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the evaluation of the Polish eastern policy in the recent decade will be a subject of heated political polemics in Poland yet for a long time to come. Hence, it should be made clear at the outset that one cannot expect Poland to come up with an “eastern dimension” concept that would emulate the northern dimension. Neither would it be possible to expect an automatic recognition and adoption of Poland's to date eastern policy by the European states as the eastern policy of the European Union. Such an approach to building an “eastern dimension” would doom the project to failure already at the stage of soliciting support for it in the European capitals.

A reasonable proposal for an “eastern di mension” is conditioned on the re--thinking of Poland's role and on a concept formula growing from the track- record of relations of individual European states with the East (including the track-record of Polish eastern policy). The key, however, is to devise a new, one would like to say “fresh”, political concept for a practical implementation. The aims and means of the eastern policy that Poland has pursued so far are clearly running out. There is a need for a fresh impulse, which, on one hand, would allow for the outcomes of Russia' s recent relations with the United States and the European Union, while, on the other hand, responding to Poland's redefined interests as a new member of the EU in the Central European region. Thus, the “eastern dimension” is above all an opportunity for the real upgrading of Poland's eastern policy. It may compel the Poles to reconsider which political, economic and social objectives they can pursue independently and to what extent they will have to make recourse to the EU's common action instruments or to look for allies interested in special projects within the framework of so-called deepened cooperation. Poland's actions within the “eastern dimension” will perforce be cut to the size of the EU policy framework (unlike Poland's relations with the United States), which means that they will have to be in adequate proportion to the EU's regional policy.

Why, in the run-up to Poland's membership in the European Union, does it seem at all necessary to define the degree to which Poland's eastern policy has a chance to continue, but also the extent to which Poland could co-determine the EU's foreign policy in the east. The concept of the “eastern dimension” and the ensuing discussion involving Poland should answer the following key questions:

a) Which states acting on behalf of the European Union are responsible for the formulation and implementation of the EU's “eastern dimension”?
b) Who is this dimension specifically addressed to?
c) What should be the role of Poland and other CEE states in preparing and implementing this dimension?
d) What areas should it embrace?
e) What should be the time horizon for implementing the EU's “eastern dimension”?

From Poland's viewpoint, the key question it is not so much if but to what extend Poland should participate in creating the “eastern dimension”.

Who should the EU's “eastern dimension” be addressed to?

The EU's “eastern dimension” should take on the form of a package of concerted proposals for economic, social and political measures that the European Union and its member states would address to select states bordering on the enlarged Union in the east. Addressing the “eastern dimension” offer to a bigger number of states in the east or even to whole regions (Caucasus, Central Asia, etc. ) would blunt the chances of any meaningful impact. In such a scenario, the EU's offer could prove at best to have only superficial attraction to its recipients and the obvious weaknesses in its real implementation would be swiftly exposed. It appears that the EU's “eastern dimension” should primarily focus on only two countries – Belarus and Ukraine, , the two states that after the enlargement will be the EU's nearest neighbours in the east. And neither Belarus nor Ukraine stands any chances of membership of the European Union in the foreseeable future.

Standing in the way of their accession prospects is a number of economic and social, but also political obstacles. Particularly in relations with Belarus, we deal with a country that is political unstable, deep in economic doldrums and extremely low on democratic standards – freedom of association and demonstration of political opinions, freedom of conscience, access to information or the freedom of the press. The situation in Ukraine is slightly better, but still a far cry from the standards accepted in Europe, as evidenced at least by last year's kidnapping and murder of Gongadze or the ongoing political conflict between the opposition and president Kuchma. However, one has to concede that both Belarus and Ukraine, in view of their potentials, geographic location, cultural and demographic positions, can expect that an absolutely unreal for now postulate of their accession to the European Union will figure on the agenda of European politics in the future. One can hardly imagine the European Union, or Poland for that matter, to fail to pursue an active policy in support of appropriate political changes in both of these countries.

The pursuit of such a policy should firmly be among the main political goals of the EU's “eastern dimension”. There are similar considerations concerning Moldova, whose political and economic modalities are now in many respects reminiscent of the aforesaid conditionalities related to Belarus and Ukraine. Moldova, too, has potential possibilities for closer cooperation with the European Union. Given a stronger involvement of the EU member states, there are chances for this potential to evolve faster in the future. Except for the countries mentioned so far, the EU's “eastern dimension” should not encompass any other post-Soviet countries in Southern Caucasus or Central Asia. The EU should develop a different mechanism of cooperation with those countries mainly in the area of security and the energy sector.

Russia and the EU's “eastern dimension”

Relations with Russia will certainly pose the greatest challenge to the EU's “eastern dimension”. Western politicians, among them European leaders who wish Russia well, often forget that Russia surpasses the EU already in terms of its territorial potential, and it is at least for this fact that one can hardly contemplate its membership in the EU. It is equally hard to treat Russia on a par with Belarus and Ukraine. However, Putin's presidency demonstrates that a dynamically changing Russia may become one of the EU's key political partners in global politics. Allowing for all possible modalities, one can discern two models for Russia's role in the proposed EU's “eastern dimension” concept:

A. Extension of the EU's “eastern dimension” to only the Kaliningrad District and possibly also north- eastern areas of the Russian Federation. The advantage of such a solution would be the full inclusion in that dimension of a fundamental Kaliningrad question, and making the Polish- -Lithuanian-Russian activities in favour of that enclave part of the European policy system to a greater extent than so far. Furthermore, such a restricted role of Russia in the “eastern dimension” would certainly facilitate the related planning and implementation of dimension measures.
B. Giving the entire Russian Federation a special status of relations with the EU, i.e. relations clearly targeting the issues ensuing from two areas – energy and security. . Such a solution would obviously also make room for a number of additional proposals concerning the Kaliningrad District. They could be based on principles similar to those underlying the proposals for Belarus and Ukraine. This solution would also steer clear of any potential similarity to the northern dimension and hence could not be called a mere duplication of the latter. It would give Russia a special status in relations with the EU and would involve more strongly the biggest EU member states in the implementation of the EU's “eastern dimension” which would thereby lose its distinctively regional nature.

It is indeed difficult to envision the EU's “eastern dimension” without Russia, , but the form and scope of Russia's participation in such a project remains an open issue. It can be clearly seen that there are no foregone conclusions and that the most reasonable approach for the benefit of this analysis is to hold out the issue of Russia's role as the most important point of a continuing debate.

Objectives of the EU's “eastern dimension”

The main objective of the proposals and activities within the EU's “eastern dimension” should be to support and encourage economic, social and political processes that will promote the EU-like standards in the countries lying east of the enlarged EU.

This objective should be pursued not only in respect of the European Union's fundamental values and ideas, notably the idea of overcoming the divides in Europe, but also in view of highly pragmatic security and economic interests. Excessive and steadily widening civilisational divides between the enlarged EU and its immediate neighbours would produce a very bad to perilous situation in the long run. Only a zone of stability and EU-like socio-economic standards in the immediate vicinity of the EU can safeguard the EU against adverse developments and provide new prospects for regional cooperation. Such objectives already apply to all existing dimensions (southern and northern) in the EU's external policy. It appears, however, that within the EU's “eastern dimension”, where only land borders (with no expanse of sea) are involved, the security aspect is of special significance.

“Eastern dimension” in the EU's external policy

The EU's external policy, which by all available sources, does not represent a coherent concept at present, should incorporate three components:

a) policy towards states (not applying for the EU membership) and regions of immediate neighbourhood: to the east – the European part of ex-USSR (not counting the Baltics); in the Balkans – ex-Yugoslavia (not counting Slovenia), Albania and Macedonia; to the south – countries in the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean basin;
b) Euro-Atlantic relations, policy towards the USA, including relations within NATO;
c) Policy towards other states and regions important to the EU interests, for example Caucasus and Central Asia, Middle East, Japan, China, South-East Asia.

The EU's “eastern dimension” would be part of the first component, together with the EU's southern dimension and policy towards the Balkans (Stability Pact). An issue requiring an additional qualification would be the positioning of “eastern dimension” vis-à-vis the existing northern dimension. Decisions to this effect should be preceded by an accurate analysis. It appears that the likely results of this analysis would be indicative of a quite clear “over- advertisement” of the northern dimension achievements. On one hand, the main by-product of the northern dimension seems to be the turning of the EU member states' attention to the issue of the common foreign policy in the East (at least in the regional terms), but, on the other hand, there is clear shortage of the means to implement specific projects. Particularly in view of the fact that the funding of the EU's common foreign policy objectives is still indefinable and is in practice shouldered by individual member states, one should primarily focus on identifying a place for the “eastern dimension” in relation to the other dimensions of the Union. As it were, one should avoid a negative competition that may emerge among the member states in the context of their interests to support the EU's activities within different dimensions. Here, any political competition between the northern and the eastern dimension would be highly disadvantageous for Poland. It means that in drafting the assumptions for the “eastern dimension” it is necessary to conduct a very intensive political dialogue with the Nordic states, mainly Finland and Sweden, to pave the way for a mutually complementary development of the two dimensions. This is of tremendous importance for preserving cohesion of the European Union's future eastern policy.

Within the policy towards the EU's immediate neighbours (not applying for EU membership) and regions of immediate neighbourhood, it would be worthwhile to consider the drafting of a coherent concept for the so-called EU's neighbour state (the related British proposals so far represent a very rough outline). This concept should be comprised of:

a) a list of criteria that a given country would have to meet to acquire the status of a EU's neighbour state: economic, social and political adjustments to the EU standards (possibly including the migration issues),
b) a list of privileged relations with the EU, to which a country with that status would be entitled,
c) a set of measures and instruments that the EU would be willing to bring forth to assist a given country in obtaining the EU's neighbour state status, parallel to the efforts that that country would be making to adapt to the listed criteria.

The EU's neighbour state concept could be a lot more helpful, than a distant or unlikely prospect of EU membership, in realistically motivating the elites and societies of the neighbour countries for addressing internal reforms and adapting to EU standards. Moreover, it could be helpful in staking out the areas on which the EU's “eastern dimension” policy should focus its specific activities and projects and, finally, in delineating the other dimensions making up that first component of the EU's external policy.

What areas should the EU's “eastern dimension” embrace?

The “eastern dimension” concept being considered here would require a relatively precise definition of the areas of life that the EU's “eastern dimension” should cover. . It seems that whatever other walks of life would eventually come into place, the “dimension” would first have to embrace the following four spheres:

a) ECONOMIC. Very important to ensuring the right functioning of the enlarged EU along its eastern borders and to a gradual synchronization of the economic systems of states that could qualify for the “eastern dimension”. It would necessitate reforms of economic legislation in the EU's immediate neighbourhood, modernization and reforms of individual economic sectors, upgrades of infrastructure, increasingly good relations between these states and the EU and its member states, etc. All of these issues should become essential ingredients of the EU's “eastern dimension”.
b) SOCIAL. A diagnosis of the social situation in the “Eastern dimension” countries is based on the assumption that an accelerated development of nongovernmental and self-governmental sectors is indispensable to the appropriate growth of these neighbour states in the longer and medium term. An insufficiently developed self-government bereft of major competence and autonomy vis-à-vis the state administration is one of the key barriers to the development of the EU's immediate neighbour states in the east. Cooperation in the social field should as much as possible include the broad sharing of know-how and sectorial experiences in the form of training projects, internships, scholarships, educational curricula, etc. As distinct from the to date cooperation in such areas, the future interaction should be broader in scope and subject to closer coordination (many failures of aid initiatives have been attributable to bad coordination or inaccurate identification of the actual needs of partners and beneficiaries, or their paternalistic and instrumental treatment).
c) POLITICAL. The link of this sphere with the social sphere goes without saying. It is only too true that the region's specificity, its historical and cultural backlogs (firstly in overcoming the aftermath of long-embedded communism) make of democratisation, respect for religious and minority rights, development of free media, etc. the prerequisites of the growth of such countries as Belarus, Ukraine, Russia or Moldova. There is no room here to provide the situational backgrounds for each of those countries, but it is obvious that without marked progress in these areas, there can be virtually no talk of any serious deepening of their integration with the Western countries, notably the EU.
d) SECURITY. The challenges that the EU's “eastern dimension” will be facing in this respect include the assurance of stability and predictable security in the region. The related expectations addressed to each of the four states concerned are certainly different. Russia, even though it does not enjoy a global super- power status at the moment, still commands a huge capability and is seen among the foremost partners to the United States and the EU. By comparison, the roles of Belarus and Moldova in the broader context of international relations are insignificant, and Ukraine's situation is presently hard to define precisely, although its international significance as a partner to the USA, EU and major European states has been steadily waning in the recent few years. Serious security challenges that the “eastern dimension” is bound to face include border protection, fight against illegal immigration and against the trafficking in narcotics and weapons, etc.

Place of the EU's “eastern dimension in the European states' foreign policy

A serious and well thought-over decision to prepare and implement the EU's “eastern dimension” will be pregnant with a series of consequences for the to-date shape of European policy. That is why we will certainly come to face the dilemma to what extent the “eastern dimension” should be incorporated in the to-date network of the EU's political initiatives. It seems that one should think of the EU's “eastern dimension” as being:

a) ALL-UNION. One should consider incorporating this dimension in the EU's external policy concept. An important role should be played by at least partial adaptation to its requirements of already running and forthcoming, even if small, EU programmes (the like of TACIS, INTERREG, trans-border cooperation projects, etc. ), designed to support concrete initiatives within the “eastern dimension”.
b) INTERNAIONAL – as part of multilateral political initiatives in the east and north of Europe and as part of bilateral relations between the individual EU member states. Another key matter is the far-reaching coordination of activities by those EU member states that have a particular interest in the “eastern dimension”.

Practice shows that initiatives built on some general declarations of political coordination usually fail to be translated into tangible actions and their effectiveness is ultimately measured with only a bigger or smaller propaganda effect. The only way out of such a scenario would be to come up with however small, but precisely defined initiatives that hold out chances of being implemented. Since Poland will certainly have a special interest in the implementation of the EU's “eastern dimension”, our active role appears to be particularly advisable in this respect. Corresponding initiatives in support of the “eastern dimension” should appear on the agenda of projected undertakings within the multilateral agreements and initiatives where Poland is particularly active:the Visehrad Group and the Baltic Sea States Council. Implementation of the “eastern dimension” seems to be also one of the potential areas of Poland's close cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (assuming an especially close interest of the first two countries), whose positions as candidates and young members of the EU could, owing to such initiative, get stronger in the future. Some initiatives in support of the “eastern dimension” could also be incorporated as “boosters” into the action programme of the Weimar Triangle.

An issue of importance to the effectiveness of the “eastern dimension” is the possibility of Poland's winning strong allies among the remaining member states of the Union. It would be of particular significance to enlist support of those countries, which, like Germany or France, are interested in the development and strengthening of the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (CFSDP). That is why it is worth presenting the eastern dimension” as an element of strengthening the political character of the Union. Notably Germany, in view of its special interest in the CEE region, appears well poised to be Poland's potential partner in implementing the “eastern dimension”. After all, it can be a project of interest to German policy.

However, it should also be borne in mind that the “eastern dimension” may as well become an area of conflicting interests in the EU, to mention, for one, the Polish and German economic policy interests. It is still not clear, either, to what extent after the enlargement will Poland be able to participate actively in creating the EU-Russia relations (so that Poland is not relegated to a sole involvement in the Ukraine case) and how much will Poland be able to resist a possible adverse tendency to keep Poland off the EU-Russian affairs.

Poland's potential action room within the EU's “eastern dimension

Warsaw's political ambitions will not suffice to have Poland co-create the “eastern dimension”. Poland will still have a major homework to do in many spheres that the “eastern dimension” should encompass. In order for Poland to play a meaningful role in the EU's “eastern dimension”, Poland will still need to make legislative changes in many areas (fortunately they are on the way in step with the run- up to Poland's accession, so let us be optimistic). Poland's serious role in the EU's common foreign policy in the East, as we would like to see it, will require an adequate preparation of Poland's government, self-governmental and nongovernmental human resources. If we now evaluate this progress in the context of Poland's broadest possible role in the EU's “eastern dimension”, we see that it is not satisfactory. Particularly important, in our view, is the postulate to train a big number of personnel in the indepth knowledge of the East as well as the European Union affairs. Having such quality staff to fall back on would be a particularly important expression of our “eastern dimension concept”. An important asset of Poland as a creative hopeful for the “eastern dimension” should be Poland's leverage to pursue a regional policy in the east and northeast of Europe, to animate and to creatively participate in the respective regional agreements and political alliances and, especially, to come up with fresh initiatives, which should be calculated for at least a minimum political effect. They will also represent a valid passport for Poland's ideas and support of projects weighing as much as the EU's “eastern dimension”. It appears that the Polish diplomacy's activity over the recent decade within multilateral and bilateral agreements (V-4 Group, Weimar Triangle, Baltic Sea States Council, relations with the Baltic States, particularly Lithuania, Polish- Slovak relations) has furnished adequate grounds for devising political visions on a broader scale. Of key importance in the EU's “eastern dimension” context can be Poland's partnership with Lithuania (perhaps the EU's “eastern dimension” initiatives should be sponsored jointly by Poland and Lithuania) and good relations with Slovakia, where the internal situation now seems to be developing in a promising direction. It is already evident that because of its modest assets and weak instruments of influence in the security area of relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, Poland should within the EU's “eastern dimension” rather focus on actions in the social sphere, with the political sphere remaining a possibility. Such an approach should become Poland's specialty and an area of particularly strong activity in the EU forum, internationally and domestically.

It could be worth considering and suggesting to the international community that it should prospectively establish in Poland special institutions (secretariats) with the task of coordinating “eastern dimension” activities by NGOs and self--governments in Poland and other interested member states of the EU. Poland would be destined to play such a role on the strength of its comparably big involvement in the aid projects in the East in the recent years, its experience in know-how transfers and the fact that Poland's NGOs active in this area have in recent years not limited themselves to spending the money from foreign sources, but that the Polish state budget and business sector have also set aside a relatively big financial aid to this end. In economy, Poland should concentrate its efforts on infrastructure projects, particularly in East-West transport and energy supply. Despite its objectively limited possibilities to initiate specific actions, Poland should nevertheless be actively involved in the working out of action concepts, plans and projects across all of the aforesaid spheres of the EU's “eastern dimension”.

Conclusion

In the context of Poland's forthcoming membership in the European Union, it is high time for Poland to responsibly speak out on its potentials to co-author the EU's common foreign policy after the enlargement, particularly towards Poland's immediate neighbours in the east. But Poland also must prepare for its participation in such projects. If Poland's systemic transformation and EU membership progress successfully, Poland will be in a position in the years ahead to fulfil its role as a co-architect of the EU's “eastern dimension”.

1. The above text is a fragment of “The EU’s ‘Eastern Dimension’ – an Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s Policy", published by Centre for International Relations (CSM); see other texts from this publication at www.csm.org.pl