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Paweł Kazanecki

Belarus, Poland and the EU’s “Eastern Dimension” (points for debate) [1]

The themes addressed to me are, in my view, quite broad-ranging. I will thus try and narrow down my presentation to the shape of the European Union’s policy towards Belarus over the recent few years and what point this policy has arrived at today. In this context, I will try to ponder the possible role of Poland and Polish foreign policy towards both the EU policy and Belarus alone. I will not describe in this connection the internal situation in Belarus, because I believe that it is familiar to everybody present here today and, besides, the discussion on whether we deal with a “softer” or “harder” regime, more or less authoritarian, would not be productive.

First of all, let me address the question of what the EU or the European countries in general did after 1996 or after Lukashenka had staged a veritable coup d’état against the democratic 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. There were at that time several responses of European policy, which we should recall. The first response was the flat ban on travel by the Lukashenka administration officials to the EU member states. That blockade was lifted at the moment when Lukashenka consented to the opening of the OSCE Mission Office in Minsk. A scandal marred the very start of the work by the Mission. A day before the OSCE Office opened, two boys were sentenced to two years in prison for painting graffiti. Thus, right at the outset Lukashenka demonstrated where the place of that Mission in Belarus was. The Mission faced two key objectives. The main problem for the EU or the European states in general was that the 1996 November constitutional crisis eliminated Belarus as a partner to any talks. The European states adopted the position that the 1994 Constitution was the sole legitimate basic law in Belarus and that the amendments made in effect of the 1996 referendum were not legal. Thus, the parliament elected subsequently was also spurned as illegitimate and, in fact, the only legal authority remaining was that same, loathsome president Lukashenka. His legitimacy originated with the 1994 Constitution and continued until June 1999. Thus, to maintain relations with president Lukashenka after June 1999 would fly in the face of the accepted doctrine of diplomacy. The ensuing discords led to a crisis of the European countries’ relations with Belarus. That is why, the main objective before the OSCE Mission was to bring about democratic elections that would lead to a legitimate mandate of parliament as a partner to the talks, as a legitimate instance of Belarusian authority. But that strategy turned awry and the parliamentary elections in 2000 as well as the presidential elections that followed in 2001 were held in breach of all rules of democratic election. Hence, the current situation is that none of the Belarusian authorities is legitimate in the light of the old diplomatic doctrine that the EU states first adopted. But nobody mentions it today.

The problem remaining for the European countries is how not to sever diplomatic relations with Belarus, because that would precipitate the loss of its empowerment as a state and would throw it wholly into Russia’s hands. The whole doctrine that had operated until the 2001 elections proved not credible enough and since those elections no new formula of cooperation with Belarus has been worked out. One can ask why this is the case and what the EU or the European countries wanted to achieve through the activities of the OSCE Mission. The Belarusian authorities often vociferate that the Mission’s main objective was to overthrow the president’s regime. I personally think that Europe was not after that objective at all, and not in the least was Germany, which headed the OSCE Mission. I believe that the main objective of German policy was to legitimize president Lukashenka as a partner to talks, all the more so as Lukashenka was seen by Europe as a guarantor of stability in the region and a guarantor of stability in Belarus.

What is the situation like today? There is no Europe’s policy towards Belarus, there is no new concept that would enable a move forward in diplomatic relations with that country. A new initiative was launched recently. It was described as a “visit of last resort”, a visit by MEPs (Members of the European Parliament), which would give Lukashenka a way out of the impasse. Lukashenka would no longer recognize the OSCE Mission as a partner to talks. The Mission’s Ambassador was barred entry into Belarus. The Mission’s top officials found their Belarusian visas expired. Thus, the Mission’s office, which in theory is still operational, does not play any role, because residing there is only a secretary and a few clerical officers with no representative or decision- making function. A visit by EU representatives could indeed give Lukashenka a “sidestep”, a possibility of sidestepping the OSCE Mission issue and moving onto a plane of diplomatic contacts with European countries within a new formula. But can such a prospect be attractive to Lukashenka? It also is worth considering Russia’s policy towards Belarus, as, perhaps, a new chapter in relations between Belarus and Russia is opening up.

It is hard to predict in which directions these relations are really heading. Until 2002, Russia had unequivocally supported Lukashenka. It had recognized the legitimacy of all successive elections in Belarus and had recognized all authorities as legitimate representatives of the Belarusian State. The first signs that Russia perhaps did not quite approve of Lukashenka came in June 2001, when Moscow did not give its unambiguous support to Lukashenka before the elections. However, it rather took the form of sounding out the Belarusian public opinion as to whether there would emerge in Belarus a meaningful competitor to Lukashenka in the presidential race. But then in July any doubts about Russia’s attitude disappeared and Moscow gave Lukashenka a big credit, which enabled him to calm down the public opinion, disburse wages and salaries and quietly run the elections. All of that happened in return for the sale to Russia of a few ranking state enterprises in Belarus. However the present year (2002) shows that Russia is no longer going to approve of Lukashenka’s to-date behavior. A conflict is brewing. The clearest evidence of that is Lukashenka’s latest visit in the Kremlin and, finally, Putin’s firm declaration yesterday (24 June 2002) that there could be no talk of any union between Belarus and Russia, a union that would de facto spell Belarus’ incorporation into Russia. Hard to say if Putin’s plans really rule out the absorption of Belarus, but his declaration means a resolute “no” to Lukashenka’s any ambitions to be treated as an equal partner if it came to the creation of a new form of statehood.

How would Lukashenka react to that? In this context, I think that the EU’s proposal would be for Lukashenka quite a good way out of an awkward situation in which the complete financial dependence on and increasing claims from Russia restrict his room and in fact place him in a position that he has never accepted, namely the position of a governor rather than a peer. Will Lukashenka really use that opportunity? We will see in the course of the next two months. It may be a moment at which either Lukashenka begins to “flirt” anew with the European countries, or his regime begins to crumble. A bankrupt regime without European funds or with “short” Russian funds is heading for a collapse within the next two years. There also are other premises that would make the prospect of Lukashenka’s coming to terms with the EU unlikely. For the past two months there has been talk that Lukashenka will cancel the local elections scheduled for the next year (2003). Canceling them would again disrupt the chances for a legitimate, democratic change in Belarus. Related to that are the plans for a referendum that would give support for a union with Russia, but one of the points in the referendum also is to enable Lukashenka to again run for presidency of Belarus. The current constitution, which Lukashenka forced in 1996, limits presidency by the same man to two terms in office. Now we are in Lukashenka’s second term, so his next presidential bid without amending the constitution is impossible.

Against this broad background, I would like to take on board the question of Poland’s role. The Union and the European countries in reality have no concept of what to do about Belarus. The past four years have also showed that the EU’s position on Belarus is highly inconsistent, flexible and fluid under the impact of various factors both in the internal situation in Belarus and in the overall international situation. One can say that in realty the European countries are not interested in Belarus, that it is not a serious political problem. For Poland, Belarus as an immediate neighbor is important. Poland’s role in this region, also vis-à-vis Belarus, is very important. But an analysis of what the Polish government is doing in this area prompts a judgment that the Foreign Ministry regrettably shows no signs of any policy concept about Belarus, nor even an attempt to work it out. On one hand, we observe two serious initiatives – the aforesaid “visit of last resort” initiative largely developed in association with Polish diplomats, and the talks on establishing a Polish-Russian commission on Belarus. Talks to this effect were held during Putin’s visit to Warsaw, and what is really quite significant here is not so much whether Poland would play a really important role on such a body, but the very fact of Russia’s recognition of Poland’s interest in Belarus. On the other hand, we see no concept of what to do about Belarus. There were meetings between the Polish foreign minister Cimoszewicz and his Belarusian counterpart Khvastovy, which would be indicative of attempts to establish some contacts with the regime and to overcome the blockade. Later ill-considered diplomatic notes came. I am referring particularly to the latest note concerning a Radio Polonia broadcast, which was rebroadcast by the Belarusian State radio. In its rebroadcast, the radio expurgated the speech by foreign minister Cimoszewicz. The Polish foreign ministry reacted very sharply and, in my view, overdid it, because that speech did not fit in with the program formula that had been originally agreed upon with the Belarusian radio.

So much about the current situation. Now I would like to ponder what Poland really could do in relation to Belarus. What should be the substance of what is called the “eastern dimension” or a Polish foreign policy strategy towards the neighboring countries? Firstly, it should be restated that Europe takes no interest in Belarus and I also think that it has not developed any concept about the rapidly changing situation in Ukraine. Nor Europe has any concept for a long-term strategic cooperation with Russia. But it is just the eastern countries – Belarus, Ukraine and Russia – that will become the main foreign policy issue after Poland’s accession to the EU. As a member of the EU, Poland will be able to aspire to formulating an eastern policy not only of its own, but also of the EU. Poland’s main competitor to such a role is Germany, which is very sensitive about this competition. At least for the past year we can hear a criticism on the part of German diplomacy of both Polish NGO activities in Ukraine or Belarus and some moves by Polish diplomacy. Germany wants thereby to emphasize that the shaping of an eastern policy should belong to it. This is an important challenge for Poland and one that requires an analysis of Poland’s role in this area. We hold one more trump card for this competition. It is the support of the United States, which has an interest in Poland’s position in this region and in the conduct of a policy by Poland towards, first of all, Belarus and Ukraine. An astute maneuvering by the Polish foreign ministry to create a balance between the American interest and a representation of the EU interest could strengthen our hand in elaborating the eastern strategy for the entire Union.

Thus, what should this policy vis-à-vis Belarus alone be like? I believe that it should be, above all, a long-term policy. None of the short-term actions taken by the EU have produced effects. Even a replacement of president Lukashenka, which could open up the way to political change in Belarus, would not generate a radically different situation in that country mainly due to the conservative disposition of the Belarusian society itself. Only long-term actions can bring an outcome. Europe is not prepared for long-term actions and hence all the greater role Poland can play. The alternative to the failure to develop such a strategy will amount to surrendering Belarus to Russia. Belarus is under Russia’s economic control anyway, so the question remains whether it has to be also under Russia’s full political control, or to be downright incorporated into Russia. Would such a solution be in Poland’s interest? Now comes the second important consideration, which I wish to underscore in discussing a policy towards Belarus: I believe that this policy should be pursued along two tracks. The first track is one of cooperation with the authorities of Belarus and I personally also believe that it is a good thing that the Polish authorities have established contacts with the Lukashenka administration. I only have my doubts as to whether one should establish these contacts right away at such a high level. It would certainly be better to begin with relations with local authorities and with a bid to establish local-level cooperation than to start from cooperation with the presidential administration. The only chance of overcoming the blockade that the Belarusian side is mainly responsible for is a patient and consistent opening for talks and reasonable contacts.

The second track of this policy is work on social transformations in Belarus, chiefly through economics and non-governmental organizations. I stress this not only because I myself represent an NGO. It appears to me that this is the only way for a long-haul conduct of some policy on the east. Besides, it we consider Poland’s role in competition against Germany, we see that we are much better disposed. We have come to hold a meaningful position in both Ukraine and Belarus owing to our active social work in those countries, whereas the German actions are limited to charitable aid from protestant churches, which are not always positively perceived by the authorities or the society which is Orthodox Christian, and, as we see, the Orthodox Church is averse to activities by other Churches on its home ground. In giving you a more detailed view of activities along these two policy tracks, I wish to draw you attention to the fact that Poland has a lot more to do especially in economy in Belarus, Ukraine or Russia than what it has done so far. Obviously, we cannot compete against big capital and we know that Russian or German capital will predominate in Belarus: Russian – due to Russia’s traditional economic contacts with Belarus, and German – due to Germany’s greater investment capability and an already set German investment strategy for Belarus, as well as Russian- German capital groups, which have already come up with a plan to share in the privatization of various enterprises in Belarus. But Poland can play a role in wholly different area, first of all the SME sector. What Poland takes the most credit for in economic reforms, particularly in comparison with the Czech Republic, is its creation of a small and medium-sized business sector. And, in view of specificity of the Belarusian economy, which has not yet generated oligarchs like in Russia or Ukraine, one can envision here a field for action in the long run. This will have an impact on Belarus’ social structures, leading to the shaping up of a middle class, which could become the basis for democratic change in that country. Belarus is a small country and small-scale actions have a relatively big and tangible impact on the overall situation there.

When I refer to work with the Belarusian society, I have in mind two goals that can be achieved within such a long-term policy. The first is the overcoming of the cultural, civilizational and administrative blockade. Risks will appear once Poland has joined the Schengen. Visas may in time restrict the cross-border traffic. At the same time, Poland’s economic changes are rapid, while economic changes in Belarus are rather for the worse and this adverse civilizational divide will be widening. The same goes true for the cultural divide, which is rather an upshot of the absence of permanent contacts between the Polish and Belarusian communities. The second goal is the “empowerment of society”. I see no way of creating a democratic system in Belarus short of the participation of a society that would demand such a system. Developing a strong society in Belarus is the only chance for Belarus not to be afraid of Poland. In this way we would gain a neighbor, who would understand the processes taking place in our country and would react similarly to certain instances of social behavior, would follow the same course of growth. I again underscore here the role to be played by NGOs from Poland. The purpose of such actions would be to develop local communities and self-help groups, which means any groups that self-organize a society, to develop scientific exchanges and exchanges of young people.

The Polish State is not promoting such actions at present. Poland’s present actions are limited to relations with Polish minorities in the east. Meanwhile, owing to nongovernmental organizations it would be possible at relatively low cost to build up quite a big elite with a positive Polish disposition and one interested in changing their country. The important thing here is to present the Polish experiences related to the economic and political- systemic transition, to show positive as well as negative lessons, which would allay the fears of the Belarusian officials and society of taking a first step in the direction of reforms. An information blockade and the incomprehension of the processes occurring in Poland are very weighty psychological factors that are petrifying the present status in Belarus. And, finally, a different promotion through culture: not doing it as it has been done so far in the form of increasing the budget of Wspólnota Polska (an organization developing relations with Polish communities broad) and financing Polish minorities in countries east of Poland, but doing it by working out a forward-looking manner of policy conduct, by the so-called social diplomacy. For the present, the Polish foreign ministry has no concept for cooperation with Polish non-governmental organizations active in the east. Nor has it any concept for promoting Poland’s experiences and I regard this as the most serious gap in the Polish foreign policy. All of the time, this policy has been relying on the conventional, 19th century principles of diplomacy practiced among officials. And one more issue is, in my view, very important to Polish foreign policy in the east. It is about the Polish State’s active role towards both the countries of Eastern Europe and the EU’s policy towards the East. The desistance from such a policy or the failure to develop a concept for it will signify the inclusion of both Ukraine and Belarus into the Russian sphere of influence. The lack of Poland’s interest in those countries and the failure to involve Lithuania, Czech Republic or Slovakia in activities in those countries will signify a growing isolation between the two spheres in Europe.

1. The above text is a fragment of “The EU’s ‘Eastern Dimension’ – an Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s Policy", published by Centre for International Relations (CSM); see other texts from this publication at www.csm.org.pl 

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