Yury Likhtarovich

Formation of Belarusian Political Arena

Introduction

An average Belarusian citizen has a rather obscure view of what is going on in political circles, and what influences changes in the government’s policies. However, he or she can readily say what impedes the improvement of their everyday life. It is here one can conclude that there are exact antipodes of explanation for the causes of the difficult situation the Belarusians are in. Some would explain using expressive words such as “radical nationalists,” “democrats that ruined the great power,” “opposition buttheads that have sold themselves to the West.” Others would argue that the problems result from the Lukashenka dictatorship, the lack of market-oriented reforms, the “pro-Russian policy aimed at eliminating Belarus’ sovereignty.” Although this explanation is rough, it is absolutely correct. What does it come from? The answer to this question can be complicated and simple. Let us leave complicated answers to experts in social matters, sociologists, political analysts and journalists, and try to give a simple answer. Such notions are created by politicians who use arguments employed by various political forces in order to gain public support they need at every particular moment of political struggle. At the same time this shows that in order to win a victory in a political game, rivals create groups in society to use them later. The political conflict that has been lasting in Belarus since 1989 provides grounds to say that such an approach is part of the political strategies of the main actors. Thus, society is to a certain degree made a hostage of the political processes, a tool, not a target, of politicians. This means that public support is regarded as an instrument for retaining or seizing power. The next question that arises is what allows this situation to continue. The answer is also simple. It is the level of our knowledge. Here we see a need to find out what is behind political statements. The first step in this direction could be research of the Belarusian political arena’s peculiarities.

Structure of Belarusian Political Arena

At present the Belarusian political arena is based on two major elements. First, political competition is not institutional. Political parties are in fact isolated from the system of government; their attempts to get access to participation in government by legal means are blocked by the ruling groups. The main efforts are concentrated into forming a broad coalition against the Lukashenka officialdom – the ruling regime. On the other hand, the process of considering and making major political decisions, as well as the staffing policy, is not transparent and is blurred by personalization, as everything depends on the opinion of one person, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Moreover, the basis of political struggle is not a difference in approaches to the solution of social problems but the choice of state ideology.

In our opinion, in the Belarusian case, we have an internal conflict of identification, which was in fact artificially created and pursued by political elites. This is the conflict between Soviet conservatism and Belarusianism, and this is the other element that has influenced the formation of the political arena. Originally, this conflict was used by the post-Communist part of the elite as a tool in order to retain power and then it was constantly reemployed to further legitimize the nomenclature’s being in power. As a result, we have found ourselves in a situation that society is kept by the ruling group under threat of disintegration. Another result has been certain structurization of the political arena. According to analyses by anthropologists of various “primitive nations,” conflicts have a dual role in maintaining social stability. “On the one hand, a social conflict can contribute to the strengthening or adaptation of social relations and organizations; in other words, it performs the function of a safety valve that save society from collisions that threaten it. On the other hand, it is conducive to the strengthening of the unity of each of the groups that act in the framework of the conflict, ensuring the balance of government.”[1] Thus, each of the political opponents, the post-Communists or the “democratic opposition” have taken shape as a group thanks to this conflict and each group is gaining strength as this conflict continues, using, for instance, mechanisms of self-identification through the existence of an opponent, rare transitions from one group to another, certain actors’ intention to take a position in between – the so-called systemic opposition.”

Currently, the Belarusian political arena is roughly divided into the Lukashenka camp and the anti-Lukashenko opposition camp. In our opinion, this is an oversimplified approach. Lukashenka did not create his camp himself. He was selected by the post-Communist nomenclature for advancing the interests of this group, for keeping power in its hands. Later, he managed to become the figure that consolidated this group and headed it. On the other hand, the phenomenon of Lukashenka was a certain catalyst for uniting most of the political forces that were beyond the government. However, attempts to pool various opposition forces in the struggle against Lukashenka have remained more formal than real. The main causes of failures in the coordination of this group’s activities should be looked for in the strategic differences of the main political forces, intestine fights for the central position in this segment. One way or another, current political splits and divisions result from the general process of the political arena’s formation. In this regard, it is necessary to answer the following questions:

In what context did the Belarusian political arena start forming? Here it is important to recall the first years of Belarus’ independence, from not only domestic but also external viewpoints on developments in Belarus.

What forces are the main actors in the struggle for “political” benefits and positions?”

Finally, what themes have become “political,” i.e. crucial for success in the political arena?

USSR’s Breakup and Communist Party’s “Disappearance.” Belarusian Case

The external context of the initial stage in the formation of Belarus’ political arena was the disintegration of the Soviet political system or, speaking more exactly, the central elites’ intention to integrate the Soviet Union with the West for gaining financial benefits and ensuring the stability of the system. This was the basis of the policy of perestroika with a view to creating the impression of the Soviet system’s democratization.[2] This was linked to the declared impossibility of efficient regulation of the totalitarian system growing isolation and the threat of greater dependence of the USSR from the developed countries. The initial stage of the perestroika was a specific attempt to modernize the Soviet system, but this did not mean that the nomenclature did not mind giving up power. Quite the contrary, the reform was designed to preserve power in the hands of the party machinery, increase the efficiency of the ruling group’s control over the social processes. Democratic mechanisms looked simpler for control.[3] At the same time, there was a fight for power within the Communist Party. Brezhnev people were being replaced with Gorbachev ones. A good illustration of that process was Estonia, were the party leaders of the Brezhnev times, including Karl Vaino, first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia (CPE); and Rain Ristlaan, secretary for ideology, were replaced by people from the group that initially tried to swim between the “old guards and the younger generation in order to join Gorbachev in the long run – Indreka Toome, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and former first secretary of the party committee in Tartu; and Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet since 1983, formerly secretary of the CPE Central Committee for agriculture (1977-79) and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (1979-83). In the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, Vaino, who was assigned to Moscow, was replaced by Vaino Valjas, who had been secretary of the CPE Central Committee for ideology in 1971-80 and appointed as ambassador to Venezuela at the end of the Brezhnev era (1980). Gorbachev recalled him from the post of ambassador to Nicaragua (1986-88) as a person who, after a long absence, did not have connections in the republic and was supposed to be good to perform purges.[4] Later, in 1989, it was these people who began to promote economic reorganization and democratize the system, by founding the Popular Front in Support of the Perestroika.

However, in the Soviet Union as a whole, the situation began to go out of control in the late 1980s because a struggle started between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as the latter aimed to take advantage of the opportunity to oppose the Union to the provinces. A result was partial disintegration of of the system and political space, which led to the loss of Soviet-type control’s efficiency by the main political actors. This made Gorbachev to surrender part of power to the regions (republics) to retain central government. Secondly, the Communist Party lost its monopoly of government and the socialist system, which was ousted by a multiparty system and a market economy. In the regions, there was a fight for power between various inner-party groups and even generations, accompanied by rivalries among Communist elites and anti-Communist groups, which relied on different political forces in Moscow, as some counted on Yeltsin, others on Gorbachev, and still others pursued an independent course.

In Belarus, at the end of the 1980s, after Gorbachev’s perestroika began, there emerged a singular political situation. On the one hand, Belarus remained a “relict Stalinist republic, where people of the Brezhnev school have been in power until now [1989].”[5] Those were Yafrem Sakalow and others. Even in 1988, after Brezhnev people had given place to Gorbachev ones and the latter had started to form popular fronts, Belarus’ Communist leadership was rather unenthusiastic about the perestroika.

At that time the center of the political spectrum was occupied by representatives of the Soviet political school. Opposition circles, which started forming rapidly in 1988-89 remained beyond the system. In that period, the Communist Party in Belarus had some 600,000 members. Prior to the August 1991 putsch, all major state institutions, enterprises and organizations were controlled by the party. Contrary to a general Soviet trend, the party tried to suppress any manifestations of opposition activity in Belarus until 1990.[6] Even in 1990, the perestroika was subject to criticism at the 31^st convention of the Communist Party of Belarus (CPB). The convention resulted in a cosmetic reshuffle of the party leadership: one conservator, Yafrem Sakalow, was replaced by another, Anatol Malafeyew, who was just younger. The replacement was aimed at both pleasing Moscow and giving a new impulse to the party, as the old and passive Sakalow was giving place to a younger, dynamic and supposedly charismatic leader.

In the same year, in March, the party swept elections for the Supreme Soviet, winning about 90 percent of the seats. The Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) managed to get through only 37 people (10 percent of the seats). The election process was tightly controlled by the party, which used frauds and manipulations. As a result, there was a sort of balance in the Supreme Soviet: a small but active group of reform advocates versus numerous but spiritless representatives of the old Soviet party nomenclature. “The former did not have enough resources to neutralize the other group, and the others …did not want, as the old nomenclature retained the entire system of ties, government and property relations, the bureaucratic machinery and the support of the Communist Party of Belarus.”[7] In addition, there were fears that they attempted to control the process of the opposition’s formation. A certain part of the Central Committee’s ideological machinery tried to provoke the intelligentsia – the BPF mostly consisted of intellectuals [8] – into a conflict with economic managers affiliated with the Communist Party, to persuade at any price the latter that it would be possible to talk to the “extremists” among art associations only in the language of force and compulsion.[9] A hypothetical explanation can be that for the ideologists, such an alliance could constitute a threat to their existence, that is why they themselves planned to establish another Popular Front, which would be led by Pyotr Krawchanka,[10] but they were too late, as they had not managed to take control of the mature Popular Front, and subsequent developments made the idea of a second Popular Front inexpedient. Another evidence of this is the fact that in September 1989, the leadership of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) devised a program aimed at the development of the Belarusian language and in 1990, the Belarusian language was given the status of the “state language and the language of instruction.” On July 27, 1990, on the initiative of the BPF and with formal consent of the chairman of the BSSR Supreme Soviet, Mikalay Dzemyantsey, the Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty. However, the BSSR leadership could not, or did not want, to implement it in full.

It seems likely that there was discord within the party as regards what should be done with the state sovereignty. Later, it became obvious that the party leadership’s strategy depended on the pan-Soviet political situation, as Minsk was following the march of events in Moscow. The Kremlin, which was pursuing the perestroika, exerted pressure on the republics, supporting the intention of “young secretaries of grass-roots organizations,” district committees, etc. to promote reforms within the party – in the sense of “economic sovereignty” – which promised them benefits and opportunities to make money and come to power and, with party funds and opportunities at hand, to start benefiting by a market economy.

After the August 1991 coup in Moscow failed and the key conspirators were arrested, the political initiative in Belarus got into the hands of the Communist Party’s opponents for some period. But the nomenclature ultimately retained power, as it had a majority in the Supreme Soviet and controlled the cabinet, the armed forces and security agencies, and the industrial sector. The declared independence was accompanied by “ruble zone” games with Russia and integration games within the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[11] The few concessions that the opposition managed to obtain were caused by the nomenclature’s fear of possible repressive measures from Moscow, where Yeltsin triumphed.[12] Evidence of that was the formal ban on the Communist Party and the tacit consent to giving up the monopoly of government, although symbolically.

This resulted in the rapid expansion of the country’s political spectrum, as numerous parties and movements began to emerge and a fight started for the center of the political area. This means that it was rivalry for determining the dominant rules of the political game and political values rather than an institutional struggle for posts and the opportunity to make decisions or influence decision-making. To be at the center of the political field meant for a group to be the key model in the political game, be able to introduce its own values and ideas as central and dominant, and impose its rules of the game. This led to a situation where opponents criticizing the central group just strengthened the group’s position because they had to play according to the rules set by the group, and ultimately, had to accept those rules although opposed to them. As a result, the system was becoming increasingly stable.

Here emerges the question as to what were those new political actors and whether it would be right to refer to them as new. The picture of the structure of the Belarusian political arena would be incomplete if these questions were not answered.

New Political Forces and Actors

The main thing that should be noted in order summarize the first two years of independence, 1991-92, is the process of disintegration of the CPB monolith and attempts to take the central place of the former party. Initially, these attempts were made by the Belarusian Popular Front, which tried to become a broad movement and represent the entire possible opposition. At the same time the BPF leadership sought to overlap the party in the maximum possible areas, trying to create alternative party elements. Here we should recall the efforts to form the Belarusian Workers’ Union in Minsk out of the BPF’s support groups, designed to draw blue-collar workers into the BPF and to counter the Council of Working Collectives of Byelorussia established in September 1989, which was led by Yafrem Sakalow, Mikalay Dzemyantsey and Uladzimir Hancharyk. Also, the BPF took part in the establishment of the Belarusian Environmental Union and attempted to organize politically active youths by establishing the Confederation of Youth Associations within the framework of the Front. At the same time an attempt was made to renew the country’s Social Democratic forces to recruit sympathizers from among the Communists. The BPF gave birth to the first Social Democratic party – the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada, as well as to the extreme right-wing Nationalist Liberal Party, and the Belarusian Peasants’ Party.

However, the Front lost the fight against the post-Communist nomenclature. The most common explanations are the policy of the pro-Communist government, which hampered the development of a party system, the Soviet-mindedness of the population, which was not able to adopt the values of open society and independence, and the BPF ‘s domination on the political arena and its reluctance to “dissipate in political parties,” i.e. to transform itself into a political party and make an effort to form party coalitions and blocks.[13] In our opinion, it is necessary to detail these explanations because they ignore the dynamics of developments and disregard the strategy of actors, who had to choose lines of behavior under pressure from circumstances, short-term political goals and the system of values.

Given the Baltic states’ case, it is safe to say that initially, the party leadership hoped to get the opportunity to rid itself of Communist ideology’s burden with the help of the BPF and ensure new legitimization of the party apparatus. However, it gradually became clear that the existence of the Front meant a threat to the existence of the nomenclature, not its legitimization. On the other hand, some influential figures, mostly among relatively liberal intellectuals close to the party attempted to join the struggle for power, relying on pro-Yeltsin “democratic” circles for support, which led to the establishment of the “Democratic Platform” and the “Democratic Movement” in Belarus.[14] Although the declared objective was to democratize the political regime, the practical objective was to make the party system the main element of the political system, even though formally. This gradually led to further fragmentation of the political arena, with real government levers being in the hands of the nomenclature. The latter no longer could tolerate such a situation. That is because given the stabilization of the political situation, which occurred following the first parliamentary elections, parties would become key actors in the political game, as the parliament was the main institution of government. This caused a change in the policy, and it became clear in 1993 that Vyachaslaw Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and his entourage decided to change the political system by introducing the post of president.[15]

After that, authorities simultaneously started an effort to establish populist movements, for instance the People’s Movement of Belarus. A campaign was launched to discredit the BPF,[16] which envisaged the manipulation of Belaruskaye Zhurtavanne Vayskowtsaw (Belarusian Association of Military Servicemen) and the imposition of useless debates about integration with Russia. The anti-corruption drive was made to serve the interests of the post-Communists. It was highlighted by Lukashenka and brought about none other than populist results. The isolation of the Front was achieved through encouraging the formation of party blocs, which united several post-Communist parties without the BPF (Novaya Belarus, Vyasna ’94 and the bloc of the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada, the Party of People’s Concord and the Party of Belarusian Unity and Concord in the run-up to the 1995 parliamentary elections. Attempts were continued to promote the idea of introducing the presidency and after a presidential election was called, the choice was made in favor of the charismatic figure of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who seemed to be able to ensure the reproduction of the former system, and was, in addition, supported by provinces’ government officials hungry for power, and some liberals. After the victory, there was no longer need for party support, and emphasis started to be placed on creating strong popular support and attaching more legitimacy to the president, which the party support could not ensure. Moreover, the post-Communists wanted to represent the president as independent of any party groups, and to ensure his dependence on the administrative apparatus only.

After this, an effort was started to marginalize the parties and push them into opposition. However, their ultimate extinction did not occur, although there were opportunities and means to do that. Thus the nomenclature sought to ensure its own stability, strengthening the mechanisms of self-identification within the apparat, which worked through the realization of the distinction from other social groups. This explains the obstinate reluctance of the state machine’s representatives to cooperate with the opposition even if they were opposed to Lukashenka’s policies. Those among the nomenclature who were ousted from it sometimes joined the opposition but continued to play according to their own rules, trying to create the impression that they were political heavy weights. Down to date, the placing of hopes on them has led to the opposition’s losses. It was the case in the opposition-organized alternative presidential elections in 1999 and the 2001 presidential elections.

A similar process of strengthening group self-identification can be seen among opposition circles. Since 1996, they have been trying to pool their forces in the struggle against Lukashenka, concentrating their efforts into forming coordinating entities, not into developing their party structure and ensuring broader public support. As a result, the spirit of being part of the opposition community is increased, which provides parties with resources necessary for their further existence. Parties have shifted the main political accent from the struggle for power – to be able to implement their own programs – to the struggle within the opposition community – to be the coordinator of activities and represent the entire opposition. This frequently leads to inner-party splits and conflicts, and the emergence of pseudo-party umbrella organizations pursuing unclear purposes.

Thus, after a decade of Belarus’ independence, we can see that a two-segment political arena has taken shape, in which the post-Communist nomenclature occupies the center and the opposing political parties, which originate from the democratic opposition that emerged at the end of the Soviet era, are situated on the edges of the political field. The main opponents of the post-Communists have been divided and marginalized. An example is the Belarusian Popular Front, which has split into the Conservative Christian Party, an ideologically consistent but strongly criticized group that has been ousted to the outskirts of the opposition community, and the Belarusian Popular Front “Adradzhenne,” which has difficulty in mixing the traditional pro-independence and Belarusian line of the BPF with tasks dictated by the current political situation. Another illustration is the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada, which has undergone drastic changes and ultimately split into several parties: the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada, the Belarusian Social Democratic Party “Narodnaya Hramada,” and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party of People Concord. In general, Belarus’ political parties are very weak, as their memberships vary from 1,000 to 4,000 people. They lack public support. Sociologists say that their popularity ratings remain at a level of a few percent. Increasingly frequently they make attempts to find allies abroad, in Europe or Moscow, or try to become integrated into the state system, which has been denying room to them since the very beginning.

Here it would be expedient to identify the matters that have become subject of political struggle. An analysis of this aspect can yield explanations for the weakness of the country’s political parties and the structural peculiarities of Belarus’ political arena.

Arena-Determining Dilemmas

Here we should consider the aspects that were initially values or ideological and political distinctions and later became factor determining the strategies of most of the political actors. This makes it possible to clarify the division into central and peripheral political values that has occurred in Belarus. This also allows us to show that this issue determines the strategies, behavior and mutual relations of political actors.

In this regard, it should be noted that this is just an attempt to schematize the basic political controversies, which is necessary for our further movement into understanding the political process in Belarus. We would like to analyze three dilemmas that determine the country’s political arena.

One of them has emerged through contraposing national revival to liberalization and social changes. Another dilemma concerns the alleged necessity to make a choice between democracy and authoritarianism, which is frequently represented as the problem of choice between possible institutional forms of the state. In reality, this is none other than the post-Communists’ attempt to conceal their own desire to retain power. The third, final dilemma is about the choice of a place for Belarus in the world. Here we also deal with government circles’ attempt to impose on Belarus the destructive idea of having to make a choice between Russia and Europe.     

National Revival vs. Liberalization and Social Changes

Initially, cultural revival demands were put forward in combination with calls for reform of the Soviet economic system. This was the case in all republics of the European part of the Soviet Union. Belarus was not an exception. Intellectuals who were affiliated with the BPF made the revival of culture and the national language the keynote of their political activity. At the same time economic reform was suggested. In the first campaigns, particular emphasis was placed on the need to introduce direct settlements among the republics and autonomy from the Union center. The then Communists above all backed the cultural demands of the newly formed Front, which resulted in the enactment of a language law and the adoption of new state symbols. However, the government was rather slow and very superficial in these matters. Moreover, after the breakup of the USSR, the authorities began to succumb to other sentiments. There were suggestions that the Belarusian language is secondary to Russian. The new state symbols started to be questioned.[17] Discussions were stirred up about the history of Belarus.[18] These subjects were extensively debated through the media, while the Front’s economic proposals were hushed up, which created the impression that the BPF was a party of intellectuals isolated from the people. In the wake of criticism against the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada for the alleged bias toward culture, Aleh Trusaw had to yield the post of the party’s chairman to Mikalay Statkevich.[19] The latter was so enthusiastic in pushing the party into the economic sphere that it merged with the pro-Lukashenka Party of People’s Concord and the phantom Party of Belarusian Unity and Concord. Liberals, being persistent in their economic demands, considered national and cultural matters secondary, thus contributing to the policy of contraposing national revival to economic changes.

The year 1992 saw attempts to artificially detach national revival from economic reform. This made it possible to politicize language and cultural matters, which helped manipulate the Russian minority, creating another opportunity to invent a threat to social stability, and force major political opponents, that is the BPF, to switch from political party activities to the defense of Belarusification, which scattered the Front’s efforts and destroyed its economic basis. A striking illustration is the 1995 national referendum on the state symbols. The deterioration of the economic situation in 1996 after some embryonic reform – pay arrears increased; the hidden unemployment rate rose to 15 percent; industrial enterprises’ warehouses were crowded with unsold products [20]– caused increased dissatisfaction with Lukashenka’s policies. The threat of the BPF winning parliamentary elections became real. The referendum weakened the opposition and changed accents in the subsequent political struggle. The issue of state symbols was put high on the list of the Front’s political priorities to the detriment of its effort to promote economic and social changes. At the same time, the government’s policy aimed at decelerating Belarusification and stepping up Russification was thinning the ranks of the BPF’s supporters.

At present a reverse process can be seen. Now that everything not associated with the Soviet Belarusian traditions has been rubbed out, the authorities are gradually withdrawing national matters from the sphere of political struggle by supporting literature, developing national television networks, reforming the political mouthpiece Sovetskaya Belorussiya, etc.

This process is convincingly illustrated by Lukashenka’s policy regarding Belarusian society and the nature and system of values that it implies. Traditionally, Europe’s most common model of society is a combination of state and national values and purposes that the country’s citizens share, but in this system, it is the state that ensures the centralization of values and identifies the indicators of “abnormality” and deviations from the system. Belarus’ current situation can be represented as a one-sided attempt by the dominant political group to impose its own system of values and historical references, as well as its own criteria of “abnormality.” The regime bases its model of society on a paternalist concept strongly tied up by symbols with the Soviet-era Belarusian model, which treats citizens as kids who are cared for by the wise President Lukashenka – formerly it was the Party[21] – who goes by the nickname of Batska (Daddy). The official model regards as a deviation from the system the citizens who adhere to a different system of values. By this policy, the regime seeks to divide society artificially into two antagonistic groups – this antagonism is built up artificially – which reproduce themselves through the mechanisms of self-identification. In our opinion, it is necessary to try to overcome this situation. For instance, it would be expedient to promote the model of a culturally plural society. This means that society can maintain stability although not all members adhere to the same values. Such a situation does not constitute a threat of disintegration to the state. On the contrary, it would lead to harmonious co-existence of different groups that have their own culture and their own system of values. The most important factor for each community’s viability is equal access to economic benefits[22] and very stable rules of the political game.

Democracy vs. Authoritarianism

This dilemma is in fact typical of all post-Soviet countries. This leads to frequent disputes about the inherent dangers and advantages of each of these systems. The use of propagandistic lies and misleading suggestions was a common practice in these disputes. For instance, in Belarus, when the constitution was under discussion, and later, in the run-up to the 1996 referendum on constitutional changes, democracy was represented as chaos and anarchy, as a system incapable of ensuring proper order, which was illustrated by the activity of the 12^th Supreme Soviet.[23] At the same time, some, arbitrarily borrowed attributes of a democratic system, such as “popular support” and “the majority’s rule” were employed to ensure a victory for the regime in the political struggle. In addition, elections and other methods of democratic government that were left served only as a cover for the redistribution of positions among representatives of the same ruling political group, not a natural mechanism ensuring the swing of the pendulum.

On the other hand, there was much talk about the need for a strong government to secure proper public order. The authoritarian method of government was congenial and habitual to the ruling group. It provided the opportunity to control the situation and get rid of the threat of losing elections in fair competition, i.e. ensured the reproduction of the system. For their part, the post-Communist opposition circles underestimated the potential of the system of unofficial relations and ties that was formed in the Soviet era and overestimated the strength of the newly established democratic institutions of government, believing in the irreversibility of the democratization process.

Now we will try to show the emergence and use of the democracy vs. authoritarianism dilemma in historical retrospective. 1991: it is becoming increasingly clear that the sands of the USSR are running out. Minsk is awaiting the outcome the fight for power in Moscow. A group led by Dzemyantsey suggests declaring a state of emergency on the entire territory of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, attempts are made to organize the Communists who advocate democratization. A faction called Communists for Democracy and led by Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears within the Supreme Soviet in June 1991. The BPF, which revised its program a year before (at the BPF Council’s May 11-12, 1990 meeting), starts pressing for independence instead of a “return to the Leninist postulates of national policy.” After the USSR’s collapse in December 1991, the Front radicalizes its demands and comes out for the resignation of the Kebich cabinet and early parliamentary elections. After the government refuses, the Front proposes holding a national referendum. This idea is backed by most of the parties and the Minsk trade union leadership. The Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada pursues a different policy, seeking to reach an understanding with the pro-Communist government circles through round-table negotiations and joint work on an anti-crisis program, which would channel Belarus into the tried path of smooth transition from communism to democracy as was the case in Central European countries. As a result, a bloc called Novaya (New) Belarus and led by Stanislaw Shushkevich would be formed to become a new popular front. However, neither the BPF nor the nomenclature agree with the Hramada. For the nomenclature, the main thing is to play for time to retain power. In addition, the idea of the referendum loses public support. In the spring of 1992, Novaya Belarus is reanimated. This time, BPF leader Zyanon Paznyak agrees to join the anti-crisis committee together with Kebich and Shushkevich in the hope of getting nomenclature circles’ support in the struggle for state sovereignty. Since the committee represents all officially registered parties and movements, as well as trade unions, it loses the opportunity to influence the government’s policy, especially regarding reforms and begins to serve the sole purpose of ensuring the legitimacy of the current government. After this, pretending they aim to democratize the country, the post-Communists, who continue to be in power, take the offensive. On October 29, 1992, the Supreme Soviet votes down the proposal to call the referendum with consent of Shushkevich, who still believes in the possibility of cooperation with the Communists. In the same fall of 1992, the United Agrarian Democratic Party and the Popular Movement of Belarus are founded with the support of the government for the purpose of strengthening the post-Communist elite’s position. (Maybe, the parties were designed for future parliamentary and presidential elections.) On February 3, 1993, the pro-Communist majority in the Supreme Soviet votes for reviving the activity the CPB, which soon merges with the existing Belarusian Party of Communists. In 1993, an official campaign starts to discredit the BPF, which, after the Front declares September 8 the Day of Belarusian Combat Glory, is labeled as an anti-Russian force and a successor of the 1941-1944 Nazi collaborationists.[24] In March 1993, the Kebich government launches a campaign for forming a bilateral military and economic alliance between Belarus and Russia. There emerges the Belarusian Scientific and Production Congress, a party that represents the interests of industrialists and supports Kebich. Most of the new political groups back the policy of rapprochement with Russia.

In October 1993, the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada, the United Agrarian Democratic Party and the Belarusian Socialist Party forms a bloc called Vyasna ’94 in order to pool their forces in the run-up to the 1994 elections and form a coalition government of people’s confidence. The bloc leaves national revival beyond the list of its priorities, keeping away from the BPF. However, this seeming attempt to reach an agreement with the post-Communists also ends in a failure, although it is not unlikely that the goal was to seize all power. In January 1994, the chiefs of the KGB and the interior ministry are dismissed following the scandal caused by the arrest in Minsk of Soviet-era Lithuanian Communist leaders Mykolas Burokevicius and Juozas Jermalavicius, and their subsequent extradition to Lithuania. After this, accusations of misappropriating public funds are brought against Shushkevich. The accusations are pressed by Lukashenka, who heads the Supreme Soviet’s anti-corruption subcommittee. On January 26, 1994, the Supreme Soviet votes to dismiss Shushkevich as chairman. Mechyslaw Hryb is elected to take his place. On March 1, 1994, the Supreme Soviet votes for the introduction of the post of president in Belarus. Parties’ attempts to prevent this fail. The following nomenclature-orchestrated presidential campaign[25] results in the election of Lukashenka as the first president of Belarus in July 1994. His subsequent policy is to use democratic institutions, in particular the 13^th Supreme Soviet, and national referenda in order to amass all power in his hands and further strengthen the established political system.

Belarus’ Place in the World: Russia or Europe

Together with the first of the above dilemmas, this one creates the main tangle of contradictions that divides political elites, being the cause of the conflict over self-identification. In January 1994, US President Bill Clinton visited Minsk apparently with a view to encouraging Belarus’ post-Communist nomenclature[26] to strengthen the country’s independence. In the same month, Paznyak issued his statement about Russian imperialism, which was dissonant to the government’s preelection propaganda that promised benefits from integration with Russia. That statement of Paznyak was probably the most striking illustration of this foreign-policy dilemma, which in fact mirrored the internal political struggle.

Why were the former apparatchiks and the new democratic opposition so different in their foreign-policy priorities? The former wanted to head the Belarusian boat toward Russia, while the latter toward the West. In most of the Central European countries and the republics of the European region of the USSR, a newly declared political priority was to integrate into the West in the hope of obtaining money and reviving the struggling economy. In addition, the new forces were based on anti-Communist and nationalist positions. The BPF was not an exception in this regard. Its anti-Communist stance evolved into antagonism against what it called Russian imperialism, which was easy to explain from a historical viewpoint. As an alternative to pro-Russian sentiment, the Front ultimately chose to propose seeking membership in the European Union and NATO, which was laid down in the December 2002 edition of the BPF program. Here emerges the question as to whether this party has enough knowledge to reverse European skepticism, as the West in general does not regard Belarus as a nation, and to build good-neighborly relations with Russia to minimize the Russian threat.[27] Theoretically, it is possible (and necessary) to integrate into European organizations to avoid pressure from Moscow and its interference in Belarusian internal affairs as was the case in Poland and Lithuania. However, this requires the elaboration of a long-term strategy and knowledge of both the European situation and the Russian stance. Because it is not likely that the Europeans would agree to admit Belarus and isolate Russia, but it is much more likely that Belarus will be welcome in the European Union if Belarus itself manages to settle its relations with Russia.

On the other hand, the former apparatchiks were not interested in following the Polish or Lithuanian pattern, as their power was based on the existence of industrial giants, unreformed Soviet-era farms and the overwhelming public sector with no privatization. This kept the government away from conducting reforms, as they would mean the loss of control over the economy, the possible loss of power through the formation of a class of owners and social resentment. Then the best way of conserving the situation was to take advantage of the cheap energy resources from Russia, its markets for the products of Belarusian industrial enterprises and the opportunities for financial speculations that the transparent Belarusian-Russian border offered. All this made the government pursue a policy aimed at integration with Russia. Moscow, which let this happen, got Minsk’s loyalty in exchange. Given these circumstances, the West seemed much less attractive to the Minsk elites. In addition, the propagandized apparatchiks from the provinces with a rather low general cultural level who gravitated to Minsk seeking power were much more anti-Western than their Moscow or Baltic colleagues. So the obvious one-sided pro-Moscow orientation of the government defused all declarations of Belarus’ “multivectorial” foreign policy. It should be noted that this policy should not be linked to the proximity of the two nations and their historical ties. Here we can see a substitution of the interests of the group in power for the state interests, of which the march of events since 1994 is evidence.

After Lukashenka came to power and started an effort to strengthen his personal power, the West’s non-recognition of his government and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s rather anti-Western policy further polarized the country’s political elements into pro-Russian and pro-Western. It was Lukashenka who attempted to reap a benefit by expressing the anti-Western sentiments of some part of the Belarusian and Russian elites and appealing to the anti-Western sentiments of the poorest groups of the population in the two countries. After the Belarusian government engineered some spy scandals, favoring the West was equated to being a traitor and hireling. The government generally applied these epithets to label the opposition. Through this approach, the government kept this conflict alive and strengthened the sense of belonging within the apparatus. This became especially necessary in the run-up to the 1999, 2000 and 2001 elections. The drastic change in the orientation of Russia’s foreign policy in 2001 for rapprochement with Europe and the United States, undermined the ground under the Lukashenka regime’s anti-Western attacks. Here we are approximating to conclusions and predictions, which are given underneath.

Conclusions. Some Remarks Regarding the Prospects of Belarus’ Political Development

It is very hard to outline the prospects of a country where there is uncertainty and disappointment regarding any changes. This means that there is little belief in the possibility of changes for the better while changes for the worse are not wanted. Society seems to be interested in preserving the status quo, which is actively used by the ruling regime. In our opinion, such sentiments are also prevailing among political circles. The main political actors are interested in preserving the existing structure of the political arena, i.e. the division into two antagonistic groups, where each of the groups obtains its material and human resources, using the existing political conflict, in which the groups’ members identify themselves through realization of their being different from representatives of the other group. Now that power has been concentrated in the hands of a fusion of representatives of the Minsk and provincial post-Communist nomenclature, the government seek to abate gradually the conflict, promoting the imposed cultural and civil model, and the established political system, which is allegedly based on the best achievements of the Soviet regime and democracy. Simultaneously, the government pursues two strategies regarding the opposition, ousting the radical opposition elements from politics and encouraging less radical actors to integrate into the system. This is supposed to result in the ultimate structurization of the political arena in a post-Communist, not democratic, form. This means that political competition will be institutionalized on the basis of affiliation to a specific territorial or occupational group, not on the basis of elections. However, in the long run, given the current situation of “permanent threat of instability,” the ruling group cannot allow itself to stop nursing the conflict of identification altogether, as it still intends to play up the threat of social instability.

On the other hand, we would like to mention some, in our opinion, substantial areas in which changes may occur. First, free society with its non-governmental organizations, which has been in existence for more than a decade, having much more autonomy than the soviets, promises the emergence of new forces. If political parties continue to be unable to represent social groups’ interests and wants, the third sector may assume this function, as was the case in the countries of Central Europe. We can agree that Belarusian society is passive or, more precisely, antipathetic to politics and traditional – in the European context – political forms of representation – parties, and that the authorities will tighten repressive measures to avoid a rise in protest manifestations. At the same time the situation in the country raises doubts about the virtue of parties to represent and advance the interests of social groups, as well as about the efficiency of the resources that parties have at their disposal. Party leaders frequently appear to forget about this function of political parties and regard the political struggle as an end in itself. Parties are not active in bringing up questions that worry the population, in particular the rise in utility rates, pay arrears, especially in the agricultural sector, the government’s policy regarding the pension and healthcare system, the authorities’ hasty education reform, which threatens the health of children. It should be noted that the ruling group is very nervous of political parties’ attempts to play up social problems and remains unperturbed by parties’ cultural demands and campaigns. New opportunities for expanding the social resource of parties are being created by the ruling group itself, which generates problems trying to decelerate the development of the situation. It is possible to achieve social mobilization using these problems. Here we can mention the politicization of the religious issue and further politicization of groups that advocate economic liberalization.

Second, Belarus is experiencing rapid changes in the external context, which simultaneously come from both the European and Russian sides. The European Union is enlarging, which means that Belarus will directly border on the Union. A consequence of this event will be that the European Union will increase its pressure on the Belarusian government to make it embark on the path of democratization. Poland has already called up on the European community to adopt a new policy regarding Eastern Europe. Per Stig Moller, Denmark’s foreign minister, has proposed applying a new strategy based on economic cooperation and the European Union’s economic support of the neighboring non-member countries.[28]

Another factor that undoubtedly influences and will continue influencing the course of developments in Belarus is the state of relations with Russia and the nature of Belarusian-Russian integration. As was said above, the 2001 transformation of Moscow’s foreign policy from covert anti-Western into declared pro-Western has considerably restricted Lukashenka’s opportunity to gain political dividends on anti-Western insinuations. Moreover, Moscow has made it clear lately that it will no longer let the Belarusian ruling group parasitize, enjoying cheap Russian energy resources. Now that the tone of Moscow’s and Minsk’s official statements about Belarusian-Russian unification has changed, there is talk that influential Moscow political circles may be interested in ousting Lukashenka and incorporating Belarus into the Russian Federation. Although this is widely regarded as pure speculation of sensation-mongers, it would be wrong to hope that the Moscow political elite will carry out democratic reform in Belarus out of good will. Arguments that Russia has not yet grabbed or incorporated any territory should not disturb the judgement. Even if, from a traditional viewpoint, Russia does not possess capabilities to claim regional hegemony,[29] this does not mean that it does not have such an intention. The methods of achieving purposes have just evolved. The Soviet-era term “domination” has given place to the terms “capability to control” and “capability to hinder.” The former can be seen in Russia’s policy regarding Belarus or Central Asia, where control is being achieved through the influence of infrastructural actors such as companies and groups in circles closely connected with the government, and through the use of temporary schemes or intrigues as was the case when Moscow assigned Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and parliamentary leaders Seleznyov and Stroyev to help resolve conflict between Lukashenka and the Supreme Soviet in the fall of 1996. The latter term can be used to describe Russia’s policy regarding the entire territory of the former USSR. Suffice it to recall the Caucasus or the Baltic republics. This is how Russia tries to ensure its regional hegemony, the seemingly independent existence of the post-Soviet republic notwithstanding.

Most probably, some of Belarus’ anti-Lukashenka politicians who advocate integration with Russia hope to come to power if Moscow attempts to destabilize the situation, provoking social resentment, and replacing Lukashenka by a coalition government representing the “democratic opposition.” Another conclusion that can be drawn from Minsk’s current relationship with Moscow is that the ruling group in Belarus views Russia, not the West, as the main threat, because Moscow has the opportunity to influence and exert pressure on government and economic circles. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the state propaganda machine to conceal the discord within the ruling group on relations between Belarus and Russia. Integration with Russia was formerly widely said to be beneficial to Belarus whereas at present it is suggested that the ruling group is highly dependent on Russia, and that Belarus has to pay for previous gains with its independence. Thus, the issue of Belarusian-Russian integration unsettled, the ruling group may fragment, which would give other political actors a real chance in the struggle for power if they readjust themselves. That is why they should start preparing for this now, through analyzing the past and forecasting the immediate future.